Author Archives: Charles Fitzgerald

Beauty is in the Eye of the Beholder, Not the Copywriter

I have given this speech at least three times this month so it is time to commit it to permalink:

You don’t get to proclaim your product is beautiful.

Beauty is subjective. If your labor of love really is beautiful, people will notice and may even say so (feel free to quote the hell out of them) or spontaneously petition to have your product inducted in the Museum of Modern Art. But you don’t get to make that claim.

Please don’t tell me “beautifully designed” is one of your top three benefits. “Easy to use” – sure. “Intuitive” – hopefully even true. “So easy even a CEO can use it” – probably a stretch but go for it. But don’t tell me being beautiful is part of your value proposition unless you’ve developed some kind of robotic supermodel hybrid of Petman and Samantha from Her.

When you’re one of those startups that shows headshots and titles for everyone in the company, people may notice the team lacks a designer but has a deep bench of data scientists, DevOps dudes and even a dog.

And if you’re peddling an enterprise B2B app, which is where this problem seems most acute, recognize that enterprise customers will put up with <blink> tags and Comic Sans if the app gets the job done (TK check if this is the secret behind Salesforce’s beautiful user experience). But the opposite is not true.

Feel free to say your app is less ugly than anything ever created by Oracle or Salesforce. Or that you wish you had the design sense of Steve Jobs, or less ambitiously, even one of his self-appointed disciples. Or that you have aesthetic guilt about your tenure at Microsoft. Or that you just really like the color orange. Those are all factual statements. But claiming your product is beautiful is not. Don’t waste precious attention and put off readers with such verbiage.

Next time on marketing prose pet peeves and polemics: power made easy!

Small Blue and the Bonsai Datacenter

Bonsai by Andreas D., on Flickr
Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic License  Via Flickr

IBM today announced new datacenter investment plans to bolster its cloud computing presence. They’re going to spend $1.2 billion to build 15 new datacenters (seen above, lower shelf). After some consultation with the Twitterati on matters of long division, it appears IBM is going to spend a whopping $80 million per datacenter. That may sound impressive until you consider that the big boys in cloud can spend half a billion or more per datacenter. Google’s most recently reported quarterly capex was $2.29 billion.

Perhaps IBM is has some special sauce that lets them go toe-to-toe with the big boys on the cheap? If so, they haven’t bothered to mention it and they’re not known for their low costs or frugality. I for one am disappointed IBM has stifled its usual impulse to pitch the mainframe as the obvious choice for the workload de jour. Surely there is a story to weave about cloud computing bringing the industry back to its timesharing roots, blah, blah, blah, mainframe uber alles? Or maybe they’ve beaten their heads against that wall enough to knock some sense into them.

In the absence of special sauce, it seems more likely that IBM is either confused about what it takes to play in the big leagues and/or lacks the financial resources. They continue to confuse cloud computing with web hosting. Do they really believe their Amazon depositioning is relevant or is it just an attempt to muddy the water? What does IBM say when Amazon utters the letters C, I and A? IBM also has real constraints on their ability to invest due to their prioritization of financial engineering over engineering engineering.

I will offer IBM some free consulting for their next big initiative to help them come up with some differentiation and a storyline beyond how much money they are going to spend. What are the odds that they find themselves budgeting a billion dollars for almost every initiative? (The way we knew they had given up on AS/400 was when their grand revitalization initiative was only backed by $125 million). “One billion dollars” has been the only page in their marketing playbook for a long time. Had I more time and dedication to the cause, I would collect all the “one billion dollar” announcements and assess their subsequent market impact. Because this is capex (and because it isn’t a round billion dollars), the $1.2 billion number is probably a real number unlike most IBM investment numbers. But there is at least one real billion dollar number for IBM and that is their Q3 revenue miss.

Various evergreen belittlements aside, IBM seems to have woken up to the reality of cloud computing and the existential threat it poses. The “it is early days for cloud” speaking point seems to have been retired. They’re overreaching and flailing around with announcements and advertising. but are at least trying to get into the discussion. But they still face an extremely difficult road. IBM’s ability to develop technology (the engineering engineering thing) has atrophied (“SmartCloud? Just kidding…”) and letting others do the technology development is risky (e.g. taking an OpenStack dependency in the absence of controlling your own destiny is looking a lot riskier). And IBM is operationally unproven across multiple datacenters. It is easy to needle AWS for outages, but another to avoid outages yourself. The real question is would anyone notice an IBM outage. Finally, IBM is constrained financially relative to the competition.

Many financial observers assume that because IBM is one of the few technology companies to have survived multiple generational technology transitions, they will successfully traverse this one as well. Past performance is definitely no guarantee of future survival in technology and IBM’s past transitions are notable exceptions to the broader industry history. And this transition is different in that the workloads in play are core workloads for IBM. With the minicomputer and PC transitions (the later of which was near fatal to IBM), the workloads in question were mostly net new and didn’t directly replace mainframe workloads. The cloud is taking core workloads, so even if IBM executes well and moves existing customers to its cloud, they will take a revenue and margin hit.

IBM is damned if they do, damned if they don’t. If they accelerate the move to cloud, they will undercut their existing business and miss their sacred financial roadmap. If they don’t, everyone else will partition up their existing business. Maybe they can thread that needle, but IBM has not shown any reason to believe they can successfully catch up to and compete with the leaders in cloud computing. Bonsai datacenters show IBM wants (or needs) to compete on the cheap.

A Dispatch from Cloud City

A few end of the year observations from Cloud City (aka Seattle):

Cloud Infrastructure

  • AWS remains a beast. Yet a chink in their armor is emerging…
  • Azure has become the clear challenger to AWS. The much maligned Mr. Ballmer is not getting credit for Microsoft’s embrace and execution on cloud. Unlike most of its cohorts rooted (mired?) in previous generations of technology, Microsoft is well on its way to making the cloud transition.
  • Despite very strong technology and an impressive operational footprint, Google Cloud Platform is still a hobby for Google. They are as yet unwilling to make the necessary non-technology investments to really compete to win here.
  • Private infrastructure clouds just aren’t happening – instead enterprises are both getting more comfortable (surrendering?) with public cloud and continuing to invest in virtualization (VMware obituaries were definitely premature).
  • OpenStack’s identity crisis is warranted. Without a credible ecosystem of OpenStack-based public cloud providers and little enterprise private cloud adoption, the OpenStack bandwagon is left providing ingredient technology to the industry itself, which doesn’t really need what the vendors are selling.
  • Rackspace’s OpenStack bet outcome is increasingly clear: they may not exit 2014 as an independent entity. They should have invested up the stack in higher value services like Amazon, not down (and to add insult to injury, I’ll wager their VMware business still is bigger than their OpenStack business). They’ve lost over half of their market cap this year. While they still sport a premium multiple, the overall trend is towards a SoftLayer kind of valuation which could put them in play for acquisition by the kind of legacy vendors who confuse hosting with cloud (isn’t HP out telling the world their balance sheet has finally recovered from Autonomy?).

Cloud Platform

  • PaaS is still a zero billion dollar category, but could PaaS end up being the level at which enterprises implement private cloud? I see more traction for PaaS than IaaS in the enterprise.

Big Data

  • In the absence of a strong set of customer successes, I think Hadoop may be spending some time in the trough of disillusionment. The challenge is not filling the data lake, the challenge is extracting meaningful and material business results from the lake. It is a data science problem far more than an infrastructure problem. How long will it take to transition to a Hadoop 2 that is robust, deployable, performance, has ecosystem support, etc.?
  • I continue to be amused that Google is so far ahead when it comes to big data that it is a material disadvantage for them. They get dismissed as proprietary while the rest of the industry is enraptured with Google’s technology from two generations back that has been awkwardly laundered through Yahoo.

What else is happening below the clouds on the ground?

Microsoft Decisions: What and Who

Cleaver by Mark Coggins, on Flickr
Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic License via Flickr

 

Bloomberg has a piece today in which multiple off the record representatives of the Stephen Elop campaign share their candidate’s vision for the future of Microsoft. In a nutshell: more Office and axe Bing and Xbox. This is a hearty endorsement for what has become the conventional wisdom, on Wall Street and amongst its followers.

The Right Way to Break Up Microsoft

The premise seems to be Microsoft should give up, retreat to the “enterprise” because Microsoft at least still knows how to do that boring stuff, and milk the remaining cash cows for as long as possible. It is easy to see why Wall Street likes this model because they value short term earnings and find it hard to model messy technology transitions. But optimizing for past success and present financial return is not the best way structure the company going forward, because it doesn’t address the challenges facing the core businesses.

Instead of just lopping off money-losing parts, I reiterate yet again my call for a more fundamental breakup of the company with Windows, Office and Server & Tools (STB) all becoming their own companies (and I apologize for not being able to use much less understand the new super-matrixed, n-dimensional segment labels). There are a whole bunch of reasons to do this, but the core rationale is both Office and STB are better businesses if they don’t have to pay the Windows strategy tax. Both Office and STB are net payers of the tax while Windows is a net beneficiary. That may have made sense pre the Post PC era, but it no longer makes sense.

Office’s mission must be to enable productivity everywhere. Holding back iOS and Android support to advantage Windows Phone and Surface has been a disaster for Office and hasn’t helped Windows. There are companies like Box that exist but shouldn’t exist because of this strategy tax. Office could also straighten out their server strategy by decoupling it from STB (SharePoint is a floor wax and a dessert topping, both in terms of use cases which is Office’s fault but also architecturally which is a strategy tax).

Server & Tools can further embrace the heterogeneity they must and a clean break would let them truly focus on being cloud first where the operating system is an afterthought. Azure is already emerging as the clear challenger to Amazon Web Services and strategic clarity would help them focus on this battle for the future.

As for Bing and Xbox, I don’t really care but on balance would keep those businesses. Yes, they lose money but in the scheme of things it is not a lot and they are necessary assets for the future. The alignment of Bing and Office has attracted extraordinarily little comment, but is potentially a very interesting strategy. And while I am not particularly optimistic about Xbox One (too expensive, too focused on everything but games), Xbox should be part of a Windows company that offers you local devices and a cloud experience that spans however many screens you have in your life.

Making Windows, Office and STB independent businesses will not only unlock value, but also solves the CEO search conundrum. Finding someone who can manage the sprawl of today’s Microsoft is extraordinarily difficult and creating more focused companies makes it much easier to find successful leaders. Which leads us to…

The Curious Candidacy of Stephen Elop

Stephen Elop’s presence on the short list of Microsoft CEO candidates has always puzzled me. Why is he on the list? Why is he out actively campaigning for the job? His resume is that of a short-tenured opportunist who has left little mark on his employers except of course Nokia where he presided over the company’s collapse and ultimate exit from the mobile handset business. Nokia may have been doomed regardless of who was the CEO, simply a helpless pawn in the face of titanic disruption, but there is ample argument that the Burning Platform decision, the singular decision attributable to Elop over the course of his career, was a disaster. Many have claimed it was both the wrong decision (the argument is embracing Android would have played to Nokia’s strengths) and rolled out in an extremely damaging way. We can only debate hypothetical outcomes, but the fact is the recent global leader in mobile handsets finds itself out of that business with the assets sold at firesale prices to Microsoft.

But Elop is touted as an “insider” so his time at Microsoft bears examination. What impact did he make on the company that would qualify him to fill Ballmer’s shoes and lead Microsoft through the multiple transitions it faces? He inherited a smoothly running Office business that, to his credit, he didn’t screw up while he was there.

His signature initiative at Microsoft was developing Symbian clients for Office. This did introduce him to his next employer, where upon arrival he promptly cancelled Symbian. Bloomberg now tells us he believes Office should be more aggressive with iOS and Android clients. But the time to do that was when he was running the Office business, not years later.

He also doubled down on Dynamics, Microsoft’s business applications portfolio (the fact I feel compelled to include that definition tells you all you need to know about the outcome).

Neither the Symbian clients nor the Dynamics focus are on par with the Nokia catastrophe, though the opportunity cost incurred may be of that magnitude if the Office business doesn’t make the transition to the cloud. But nothing about Elop’s tenure at Microsoft suggests he is a exceptional candidate to help the company successfully navigate its many challenges. Beyond that, and perhaps most ominously, the Office development team apparently stopped talking to Elop, at which point he decided he wanted to relocate to Finland. Alienating your development team is bad form for software executives.

Elop is a polished, hard working and by all accounts nice guy (he arrived just as I left, so I have never met him but have talked to many people who have worked with him at different companies) who plays the executive role well. But Microsoft has big shoes to fill and needs a world class software executive. There is nothing in Elop’s record that suggests he is a guy who could return Microsoft to greatness. Boldly leaping (albeit anonymously) on the bandwagon of proposing to axe Bing and Xbox as if that will somehow address the Post-PC challenges of the Windows business does nothing to mitigate this concern.

It may be that Elop’s inclusion on the short list is to help manage a sensitive partnership and acquisition beset with interesting optical issues, and he is not really a candidate. But he is clearly campaigning for the job so invites this scrutiny. I fear for the Seattle real estate market if he is the only guy who actually wants the job.

Dinosaur Down: IBM’s Q3 Earnings

Scene: Armonk, New York

The earnings release speaks for itself (love that typeface – they must still do press releases on a Selectric typewriter in the IBM museum), but a few comments:

A billion dollar (as in $1,000,000,000) miss on the top line. Everything in varying levels of freefall, led by the swan dive of the hardware business (Power Series down 38%!). After a decade of the consistency so prized by Wall Street, that is three misses in a row for IBM and six straight quarters of declining revenue. Yet they beat their EPS number (modulo “other stuff”) and recommitted to the EPS roadmap for the year. Somehow, profits keep going up even as revenue declines (key contributor: a materially lower tax rate).

The earnings release in a nutshell: “Growth markets revenue down 9 percent”.

Cloud is starting to bite IBM and as I have noted, they lack a relevance amidst generational change. The company made some more detailed yet meaningless claims about cloud revenue. As with Q2, “cloud revenue up more than 70 percent year to date” but with no definition of what constitutes cloud (last week they were out making a distinction between “cloud-enabled” and actual cloud services). They did break new ground and say “$460 million is delivered as a cloud service” which presumably is mostly SoftLayer. Most glaring, IBM still doesn’t seem to have any material customer references, either in terms of the cloud technology being consumed or in terms of business impact.

IBM’s fundamental problem: they supply those being disrupted by technology, not those doing the disrupting. Today an IBM dependency can be an existential risk.

Exploring Alternative History

Tablet circa the year 2000

Bloomberg has a nice piece revisiting the broad vision Microsoft laid out in June 2000 at the grandiosely named Forum 2000. They even have an edited cut of some of the scenario videos developed for the event to bring the vision to life.

The event was originally scheduled to open the new millennium in January with a bang and more importantly to lay out Microsoft’s vision for the 21st century. The company felt intense pressure to reassert its thought leadership on at least three fronts. Microsoft, by virtue of being a business with actual profits, probably had an even greater relevance problem during the height of the dot com mania than it does today. Second, the unrelenting antirust assault on the company was building to its climax and the company desperately wanted an alternative narrative. And, largely forgotten today, the company was very concerned about demonstrating it would not lose a step in the transition to its brand new CEO, one Steven A. Ballmer, who had just taken the reins from Bill Gates.

The event was pushed from January to March and then ultimately June because the dates kept overlapping with antitrust rulings. That event kicked off a train of events that lead us directly to Microsoft’s current situation and the search for a new leader. It definitely provides a glimpse of a different trajectory for Microsoft over the last decade.

The original process to define Microsoft’s forward vision was through a set of technical committees made up of Microsoft’s best and brightest technologists. Despite high hopes and leaks to the press that such a process was under way, this approach was pretty much a complete bust. As that became apparent, Steve asked Paul Maritz to oversee an effort to pull together a compelling vision for the company. Paul described this exercise as “creating a new parade”.  A small and fairly eclectic group was formed of people from across the company but largely outside the engineering ranks. We sketched out the broad attributes of what things going forward would look like and then five sub-teams were tasked with making this brave new world come alive for consumers, small business, enterprises, knowledge workers and an end-to-end healthcare scenario that illustrated what developers would be able to build. Each group scripted and then shot professional quality videos from the user perspective.

I don’t think people appreciate how close Microsoft came to completely imploding in 2000. Employees woke up every day to relentlessly negative headlines from the DoJ case. It was not yet evident that the surreal world of the dot com bubble had ended, and even if you weren’t being wooed daily to join revenue-less startups with ridiculous valuations, you felt obligated to explore options.

Forum 2000 changed all that internally. It provided a sense of purpose and showed how the whole could be greater than the sum of the parts. Soon after Forum 2000, Mark Lucovsky, one of the key contributors to Windows NT, the inventor of Win32 (he also likes to brag he invented “DLL Hell”) and one of the company’s distinguished engineers, showed up with an architecture to make the Forum 2000 videos real (the ability to actually implement had not been the foremost consideration in painting the vision…). This lead to .NET My Services (aka hailStorm) which was announced in the spring of 2001.

.NET My Services was a cloud-centric model using web services to deliver consistent, personalized experiences across a wide variety of devices (including non-Microsoft devices – the very first device demonstrated was a Palm). It was also an API-first model, which meant any endpoint could access the system (this is an approach the Facebooks and Twitters claim, but regularly violate in the name of “protecting the user experience” which really means protecting ad revenue). It was a major departure from Microsoft’s traditional PC-centric platform and also introduced a subscription business model as opposed to the traditional license model. It was an open platform accessible from any device or service through open XML-based protocols but could be bootstrapped using Microsoft’s vast footprint of devices, applications and services. It represented a fundamental shift to a service-centric world, both technically and in terms of business model.

By 2001, it was clearer that the dot com mania had been a giant bubble and wasn’t coming back, plus the appeals court ruled that Microsoft would survive the antitrust proceedings intact. The confidence stemming from these positive external factors, however, ultimately undermined Microsoft’s desire to invest and realize the new vision.

Competitors like Sun Microsystems, no doubt horrified that their years of lobbying had failed to hobble the company, now faced a revitalized Microsoft with a vision for the future that was compelling to customers and driving the industry discussion. When they probably should have been figuring out how to save a business shackled to the dot com ship, Sun embarked upon a very effective campaign of demagoguery around Microsoft leading the shift to a user-centric model. As a result, My Services ushered in the first big industry debate around identity and privacy in the cloud. In retrospect, Microsoft’s personal computing heritage and fundamentally user-centric approach to give users full control over how their data would be shared looks vastly superior to today’s world administered by the almost interchangeable Big Brothers of Facebook, Google and NSA.

With the competitive and existential threats from dot coms and the DoJ having abated by this time, Microsoft chickened out on seeing it through. It was easy to back down from the industry debate over identity, shirk the challenges of figuring out the subscription service model and revert to the comfort and familiarity of good old Windows and Office. Harvard Business School later did an interesting case on the tensions between the old and the new camps inside the company and how it played out.

I don’t think it is widely appreciated that WinFS was born of a desire to realize the My Services scenarios, but to do it in a Windows-centric way. There was broad agreement on the importance of the scenarios, but strategic nostalgia for Windows resulted in the company trying to rethread them through the franchise and revisit the eternal dream of integrated storage. Instead of the truth being in the cloud, the truth would reside on Windows and everything would have to sync with your PC (just don’t turn your laptop off…). This decision triggered a sequence of events that directly brings us to the present day where the erosion of the Windows franchise played no small role in Steve Ballmer’s departure,

My Services was shut down, with CTO and WinFS cheerleader David Vaskevitch dismissively telling the team the company “didn’t need another $500 million business”. The fixation on WinFS technology brought down Longhorn, the release of Windows scheduled to follow Windows XP. Simply put, WinFS was too ambitious technically. After much internal debate, Longhorn came to an end with the “Longhorn Reset” whereupon the company embarked on the far less ambitious Windows Vista (and WinFS was never to be seen again, although I have flashbacks when I listen to the Hadoop guys talk today). However, given it had been over five years since Windows XP had shipped, the company felt pressure to rush the product out the door to meet obligations to customers who had paid for a new version of Windows as part of their enterprise agreements. Hence the “Vistaster” of shipping a half-baked version of Windows.

The company then spent three more years cleaning up the quality, performance, haphazard user experience and packaging of Vista, resulting in the very solid Windows 7, but failing to move the PC industry forward in any material way during that time. Windows XP remained the most popular version of Windows and Microsoft was forced multiple times to extend the end of life of Windows XP by a customer base that was just not compelled by multiple subsequent releases.

Meanwhile, iPhone and iPad (and imitators like Android) were in market and Microsoft’s Post-PC nightmare was looking very real. The company decided to focus Windows 8 almost exclusively on tablets, hoping to pull the tablet category back into the PC universe. Except that didn’t happen. Windows 8 on tablets received mixed reviews. Surface was a costly mistake, both financially and in its impact on critical OEM relationships. And it screwed up the desktop experience for billions of PC users (one senior Microsoft executive told me Windows 8 was only for tablets, but didn’t answer my question of why they neglected to mention that in the advertising). Which brings us to the present and the search for a new CEO.

In retrospect, this sequence of events is crystal clear in a way it never is in the fog of the present. Even with greater commitment, there are a million other ways the Forum 2000 vision could have gone wrong. Parts of the vision were dead on, others such as assuming tablets would rely on a stylus were big misses. It was still predicated on bootstrapping from the current Microsoft installed base, which would force a myriad of tradeoffs between old and new every day. There were major business challenges to overcome in building a successful subscription business, particularly as the Google advertising revenue volcano was just beginning to erupt. Microsoft subsequently spent years drooling over the prospect of hundreds of billions of dollars of advertising moving online, without fully internalizing that capturing those revenues would require behavior that was in many ways antithetical to the personal computing ethos at the core of the company. The good news is the rise of the tablet kept Microsoft from turning Windows into an ad-funded desktop billboard monstrosity.

The Price of Success

And of course, Microsoft faced the innovator’s dilemma in spades. The last decade of Microsoft’s history is a classic and very public case study on how a very successful company deals with disruption (disruption it knows is coming). The dissipation of the Forum 2000 vision was very much the result of a battle between seemingly reactionary forces exercising their fiduciary responsibilities and the hazy dreamers of a less distinct and unproven future. The counter-revolution obviously prevailed, at least temporarily.

Some have even argued that Microsoft did the right thing by maximizing Windows profits for as long as it did (and is still doing even though Windows profits dipped slightly below $10 billion in the last fiscal year). Horace Dediu’s recent podcast “The Limits of Executive Power” has an interesting take on this (and smart commentary recently on Microsoft is hard to find):

We begin with a defense of Ballmer for preserving great things, continue by condemning him for not having destroyed those very same things and end by asking whether anyone could have done the right thing.

The Innovator’s Dilemma came out in 1997. We all read it at Microsoft and were looking for disruption behind every tree. Discussions about the need to cannibalize Windows before someone else did have been going on for at least 15 years. And in the meantime, the company has banked profits from Windows alone in excess of $100 billion (I have not done the actual math but the number is of this order of magnitude). Clearly undermining that profit stream proactively 15 years ago was the wrong thing to do, but how should the company have avoided its current situation? The company invested in pretty much every kind of non-PC device including smartphones (Microsoft was the leader in this space as recently as 2006), tablets (albeit with styluses) and a bunch of goofier form factors.

I believe the fundamental problem was the unwillingness and/or inability to transcend the single device (UPDATE: I should make explicit that this is a reference to Tim O’Reilly’s popularization of Dave Stutz’s farewell from Microsoft missive which was written after the My Services experience). Microsoft had the vision and means to both lead the industry and bridge its existing businesses to a cloud-centric, multi-device world, but failed to follow through. Now it finds itself belatedly embracing this model but from a disadvantaged position. It is yet another technology industry example of innovations conceived in one place being successfully commercialized elsewhere that lacks the baggage of the conceiver.

Near the end of my tenure at Microsoft, I was in a meeting with a cast of thousands. One of the presenters said “we wouldn’t want to do another hailStorm”, expecting all the heads in the room to nod in unison. The SVP in the room turned to me and said “we should have done hailStorm” to which my answer was “damn straight”. The rest of the room was aghast. I suspect this viewpoint is not as contentious now, even at the board level. Success can be a bitch.

Looking Ahead

Sayonara

With the initial frenzy around the great Ballmer succession sweepstakes slowing down, lets look ahead at how things may play out:

Timing

I can’t believe this will take 12 months to resolve or that the company can afford to let it drag on that long. If the board can’t find a new CEO in three months, they’re never going to find someone. My guess is they shoot for an announcement around November with a January start date for new guy. Overlap between old and new CEOs is fraught with issues, so my guess is Steve will get an extremely well-deserved and complete summer vacation next year. UPDATE: the fact ValueAct doesn’t get its board seat until early next year is another impetus to get this decision made before then.

Candidates

I speculated discretely a little here, but am stunned at some of the crazy names in play. How does a company like Ladbrokes stay in business if this is an example of their handicapping skills? Does anyone know how to arbitrage this insanity? And where is Harold Stassen in this race?

I said earlier there was really only one internal candidate. After more thought, I now think there are two but the second one is not showing up in all the speculation (which is really surprising because this puts him in the minority it seems of Microsoft employees).

The Re-org

I maintain my earlier (and evidently not safe for publication) claim that the ongoing functional reorganization is batshit crazy. It was crazy with Steve, but it is barking mad with an unknown new leader showing up at some indeterminate time in the future. But the company can’t go back to the old model at this point and has to keep marching ahead in the absence of any other option. I guess they keep implementing this re-org until the new CEO unveils the next re-org. In the meantime, between a lame duck CEO and the groping-in-the-dark of the current re-org, Microsoft is largely on hold strategically (which makes it all the more important to find the new leader quickly).

Breakup

The uncertain transition period and ongoing re-org to greater centralization actually make it harder to break the company up into the “Svelte Steves”, but this is still the right solution for Microsoft’s existential plight. Hopefully the board will realize after interviewing a bunch of candidates that there isn’t anyone likely to manage the sprawling software conglomerate that is Microsoft today any better than Steve and they should break the company up, create a more focused set of companies and unlock substantial value.

Layoffs

I hate to say it, but these seem almost inevitable upon the arrival of whoever comes next. Every new CEO wants to get bad news out of the way while they can still implicitly (or explicitly) blame their predecessor. And I think one of the big motivations for the recent re-org was to “increase marketing efficiencies”. Microsoft laid off a couple hundred marketing people last year, but rumor is the original target was ten times higher. This has implications for local hiring and the Seattle real estate market if nothing else.

Executive Departures

Just as we saw an exodus of “Bill guys” after Steve took over, there are some “Steve guys” that it is hard to imagine being part of any new regime. Kevin Turner would be one (and for anyone wagering on KT as the next CEO of Microsoft, I will take the other side of that bet for every penny you want to put down). Mark Penn, who still lives in the other Washington, may  suddenly discover Hillary’s 2016 campaign is ramping up (perhaps they will have forgotten his prior contributions). And there are some of Steve’s Pro Club basketball buddies with their brogrammer bonhomie (except they lack even brogrammer-level programming chops) whose career trajectories could be impacted. Who else is busy updating their LinkedIn profile (beyond every marketing employee at the company)?

NBA Basketball Returning to Seattle

Steve can get busy on this front, just as our archenemy the hated and despised David Stern exits the scene. Steve would be a great owner (and cheerleader – every home game will like MGX to him), a la Mark Cuban. Others have suggested Steve could also help salvage his home town of Detroit.

What else should we expect on the Microsoft front as this transition plays out?