Google’s Scalability Day

In May 1997, Microsoft held a big press event dubbed Scalability Day. Microsoft was a relatively new arrival to enterprise computing and was beset by criticism it wasn’t “enterprise ready”. The goal of the event was to once and for all refute those criticisms and get the industry to accept that Microsoft would be a major factor in the enterprise (because, of course, that was what the company wanted…).

Microsoft at the time was an extremely engineering-centric company, so it processed all the criticisms through a technical lens. Soft, cultural, customer, and go-to-market issues were discarded as they did not readily compute and the broader case against Microsoft’s enterprise maturity was distilled down to the concrete and measurable issue of scalability. The company assumed some benchmarks plus updated product roadmaps would clear up any remaining “misunderstandings” about Microsoft and the enterprise.

The event was a disaster and served to underscore that all the criticism was true. It was a technical response to non-technical issues and showed that the company didn’t even know what it didn’t know about serving enterprise customers. Internally, the event served as a painful wake-up call that helped the company realize that going after the enterprise was going to be a long slog and would require lots of hard and not very exciting work. It took over a decade of very concentrated focus and investment for Microsoft to really become a credible provider to the enterprise. Enterprise credibility is not a feature set that gets delivered in a single release, but is acquired over a long time through the experience and trust built up working with customers.

I couldn’t help but think about Scalability Day while watching Google’s #GCPNext event today. After telling us for months that this event would demonstrate a step function in their ability to compete for the enterprise, it was a technology fest oblivious to the elephant in the room: does Google have any interest in or actual focus on addressing all the boring and non-product issues required to level up and serve enterprise customers?

As is their norm, Google showed amazing technology and highlighted their unrivaled infrastructure. And they have as much as admitted they’ve been living in an Ivory Tower since Google Compute Platform was announced in 2012 and “need to talk to customers more often”. Recognizing you have a problem is always the first step, but beyond throwing the word “enterprise” and related platitudes around, they did little to convince us they are committed to traveling the long and painful road to really serving enterprise customers.

Some may wonder why Google needs to focus on the enterprise at all. Isn’t it just legacy? Couldn’t they just focus on startups and position themselves for the future and not worry about the messy past or present? Unfortunately not, as it is the shift of enterprise IT into the cloud that makes cloud so interesting. As the enterprise moves, you have a jackpot on the order of a trillion dollars of TAM. To play to win big in cloud, you have to serve the enterprise (and serve it well).

Google has many intangibles to overcome if it wants to be a serious enterprise player. They still seem to believe every potential customer wants to be like Google. The vast majority of companies aren’t Google, can’t ever be Google and don’t even want to be Google. SnapChat and Spotify are not exactly emblematic enterprises. Culturally, Google starts with even less experience with enterprise customers than Microsoft had at the time of Scalability Day and arguably an even more engineering-driven culture with even less appreciation for the cognitive foibles of the median human. Unlike a Microsoft that had building an enterprise business as its top priority, Google the advertising company and Alphabet the technology conglomerate have many other (and frankly way cooler) priorities. It isn’t clear that a mundane investment in say 5,000 enterprise sales and support people will get the nod over the moonshot de jour (Drones! Robots! Life Extension! Board Game Championships! Squirrel! Space Elevators!).

It is great that Google has woken up, now recognizes the magnitude of the commercial cloud opportunity and wants to chase it. But we’re still waiting to see signs Google understands what that entails and will actually make the vast commitment and investment in activities beyond mere technology required for success.

Understanding Cloud Numbers

Tis earnings season, so cloud revenue and growth claims will fly fast and furious. The inability to compare vendors on an apples-to-apples basis can be frustrating. But by focusing on companies’ primary activities, and excluding their immaterial businesses, the sources of revenue for both the major hyperscale cloud providers and the remaining wannabes are easy to understand:

The diagram above illustrates the five distinct sources of cloud revenue: Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS), Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS), Software-as-a-Service (SaaS), Hot Air about Services (HaaS) and Snapchat.

A Dispatch from Cloud City – State of the Union 2016

With a venerable tradition dating back over a year, the annual Platformonomics state of the cloud union strives to combine the exhilaration of the running of the bulls at Pamplona with the hyperbole of Oracle’s annual proclamation that this year they really are serious about cloud. Or at least to land a few jokes along the way.

In summary, we’ve reached the end of the beginning for cloud computing.

There is no longer much question whether public cloud will be the foundation for IT going forward; instead we quibble about timing and implementation details. The largest enterprises as well as the most sophisticated workloads are wafting up into the cloud. The leaders are distancing themselves from the pack while the dreams of cloud wannabes are deflating like footballs around Tom Brady. Legacy vendors’ worlds are imploding. Private cloud proponents are harder and harder to find: except for those few diehards hunkered down in their closet-sized data centers with several years supply of canned goods and tape backup cartridges, previous private cloud proselytizers now talk earnestly about hybrid clouds in hopes of retaining a few on-premises crumbs in the process. And even the very largest corporations are realizing they can’t keep up with the hyperscale public clouds.

I contend there were two critical inflection points for cloud this past year:

Customers tipped, specifically the enterprises who spend vast sums on IT. Most CIOs have shifted from resistance or tire kicking to active embrace, and are doing so increasingly for business reasons as opposed to technical. Sticking your head in the sand is no longer a viable option. The objections have been knocked down one after another. Security turned out to be powerful a reason to go to the cloud, not shun it. The enterprise tipping point is critical because it dramatically expands the size of the cloud opportunity. We can now realistically talk about a trillion dollars of existing IT spend in play, aka the “cloud jackpot”.

Amazon’s transparency, both financial and cultural. The breaking out of AWS financials in April forever banished the platitudes “your margin is my opportunity” and “the race to the bottom”. AWS proved to be a very large, very profitable and very rapidly growing business. Even bulls were surprised to learn not only that the business is profitable, but much more profitable than anyone imagined. The initial operating margins for AWS were almost identical to those of financial engineering savant IBM. Amazon also had some unsolicited transparency inflicted upon it by the New York Times, who took a deep look at the company’s culture.

“I CAN SEE THE CLOUD FROM MY HOUSE”

My thesis for the last two years has materialized: it is a two horse race located here in Cloud City (Seattle) with AWS in the lead and Microsoft the only other vendor who can still see them. Besides being extremely convenient for me, this means your cloud landlord is probably in Seattle. Please don’t be late with the rent check. The geographic version of Gartner’s Infrastructure-as-a-Service Magic Quadrant (™ ® © All rights reserved. p = 0.796513. Trough of disillusionment. Etc.) underscores that the cloud world is not flat.

It is so obvious that even the denizens of Wall Street have noticed, with one brokerage firm hyping it as a ‘206 area code street battle for the cloud’. (Never mind that Microsoft is in a different area code. I’m sure they’re using an area code map from The New Yorker where everything west of the Hudson blurs together, just as all those buy and sell recommendations from east of the Hudson blur together).

Where is Google in this race? In some ways they have the fastest horse and are certainly the third hyperscale player in terms of their global infrastructure footprint. But Google’s horse is sitting some other pasture, contemplating space elevators, indifferent to the idea they need to actually show up for the race to win it.

I have a fundamental question for each of the hyperscale players pertaining to whether and how market shares will shift as this market continues to grow, plus some thoughts on the rest of the rapidly diminishing field.

AMAZON WEB SERVICES

Amazon remains the cloud trailblazer, maintaining their frenetic pace of innovation while also making necessary investments to become a mainstream enterprise provider. The question for AWS is can they adapt and evolve their culture in order to extend their current leadership into dominant share of that trillion dollar cloud jackpot? (Note that cloud will also bring significant revenue compression, aka customer savings.) This is very much an issue of “what got you here won’t get you to the next level.”

Beyond all the substantive if boring investments required to sell to and support enterprise customers, there are a bunch of cultural issues AWS must navigate. Some stem from their position inside Amazon and some are unique to AWS. The broader Amazon culture issues that the New York Times highlighted also impact AWS’s ability to realize its potential, not least their ability to hire and retain talent. AWS is a very different business from the rest of Amazon and one sitting on the pole position of a trillion dollar opportunity. It requires a different culture than the core Amazon MVP trial balloon autocannon and one that doesn’t resort to zero sum political hackery to assuage its ego.

Public cloud providers are among the most important dependencies any company will take. Successful vendors in this position understand the nature of this relationship with their customers and actively work to build customer trust and mutual co-dependence. Not surprisingly, enterprise vendors are very transparent with their customers. Yet this is at odds with the secretive Amazon culture that seems incapable of putting numbers on the y-axis of charts.

Even more, successful enterprise vendors mitigate customer fears of lock-in. AWS has not figured this out and is struggling with lock-in fears, as evidenced by what can only be seen as disappointing adoption of higher level services like the EC2 Container Service and Lambda, despite their technical appeal. Business as usual will not overcome these fears, and not addressing them means a future where customers only feel comfortable consuming base compute and storage. Being cognizant about your own power is challenging, as big technology companies’ internal mindset invariably lags their growth. They go on thinking they’re the plucky little startup long after they’ve become Godzilla.

I used to think Amazon should spin off AWS so it could maniacally focus on retaining or expanding their current share of the cloud jackpot, and build the distinct culture necessary to fully realize that opportunity (and avoid the distractions from the rest of Amazon). After seeing the financials, I believe AWS should spin the rest of the Amazon e-commerce business.

MICROSOFT

Microsoft has executed extremely well to emerge as the only credible challenger to AWS, leveraging both their platform heritage plus the fortune of a massive and overly-optimistic infrastructure build-out for search. Further, they’re the only vendor from a previous generation to make the leap to hyperscale. Unlike many of their peers, Microsoft’s survival in the cloud era is not in doubt.

But as the enterprise market for cloud really begins to open, the question for Microsoft is whether they can bring their enterprise capabilities to bear in a way that both reels in AWS and allows them to materially expand their share of the cloud jackpot. It is not clear Microsoft fully appreciates those enterprise capabilities, in relative or absolute terms. It is a long road to become a credible enterprise vendor, and having lived through that process when I was at Microsoft, it brings great cognitive dissonance to realize they are by far the best of the hyperscale bunch (and it is even weirder to see the company getting good marks for “Playing well with others” these days). Microsoft also has an advantage as a full spectrum provider across IaaS, PaaS and SaaS, to which AWS is just starting to react. But more of the same is not going to materially increase Microsoft’s market share position. Further success starts with a strong dose of self-awareness.

GOOGLE

The big question for Google is when will they realize cloud is more than just an engineering problem? If they want to build a real business where customers take a enormous dependency on them, they are going to have to do some critically important but mundane things that don’t involve algorithms. Worse, it is likely to involve fickle humans. They must overcome their deep antipathy to both customer-facing operations and enterprises as customers.

Post Alphabet, where any previous inhibitions about pursuing new hobbies have evaporated, it is even harder to imagine the “capital allocators” choosing to invest in thousands of enterprise sales and support people given alternatives involving life extension and/or space elevators. After all, won’t the robotics division eventually solve any problem that today requires humans?

THE CULLING OF THE WANNABES

Last year we catalogued the delusions afflicting a long list of public cloud wannabes. This year we simply observe the epidemic of sobriety sweeping the vendor landscape (and the morning-after wreckage). HP managed to exit the public cloud business not just once but twice this year. Helion is Heli-off. Rackspace, still recovering from its OpenStack misadventure, is shifting its center of gravity from the data center to the call center. Both vCloud Air and Virtustream have disappeared into a miasma of highly leveraged financial engineering emanating from Austin. AT&T, CenturyLink and Verizon are all hoping no one remembers they once claimed to be public cloud providers (and probably will get away with it). Cisco, presumably, has filed a missing persons report for their InterCloud.

THE SUPERBOWL OF CLOUDWASHING

While the number of hallucinating vendors has plummeted, devotees of delusion should not despair. Despite all the departures, aggregate levels of industry delusion may be hitting new highs between the efforts of IBM and Oracle. These delusional dinosaurs are locked in a battle every bit as fierce as one between the hyperscale competitors, except they are vying for the World Championship of Cloudwashing™. Given cloud poses an existential threat to both companies, it is not surprising they are talking cloud. But their delusion manifests itself in the colossal gap between their rhetoric and their actual capabilities.

I have been arguing for almost three years that IBM is likely to be the cloud’s biggest scalp. Their best outcome is they’re just a much smaller company in the cloud era, not that they’re executing on that path. The stock is down a third since I started beating this drum and is currently exploring new five-year lows. They continue to confuse boutique hosting with hyperscale cloud, and have been reduced to asserting Watson will somehow be their cloud Hail Mary (at what point is it reasonable to expect Watson to progress beyond an endless PR campaign, never mind drive revenue material enough to bolster the ever-shrinking IBM topline?).

A year ago IBM had the cloudwashing title wrapped up but Larry “Lazarus” Ellison is not one to back away from a challenge. Hypercompetitive: yes. Hyperscale: not even remotely. The question for Oracle is do they really believe it when they assert they are the leaders in cloud (or even have a cloud as opposed to some SaaS apps?) or they believe that empty rhetoric is a legitimate substitute for millions of lines of code and billions of dollars of capex? It is embarrassing when your employees feel compelled to point out the discrepancy between announcements and action, and in particular recurring confusion around tenses (also a lesson here for press who happily write the “this time we’re serious AND we are already the clear leader” Oracle cloud story every year without reflecting upon their credibility or past proclamation performance).

But this speaks volumes about Oracle’s cloud:

For instance, when the team was struggling with Oracle’s central IT to get the server resources they needed, the team requisitioned a bunch of desktop computers from Oracle’s Seattle office and turned them into an OpenStack-powered private-cloud-development environment so they could continue their work in peace, right in the middle of the office floor.

IT involved? Check. Private cloud? Check. OpenStack? Inauspicious. Desktop computers under the desk? Are you f*%king kidding me?

To paraphrase William Goldman: “Follow the capex” with IBM and Oracle. We’ll see if they’re still pretending next year.

(CLOUD) BURSTS

Dell/EMC/VMware/WTF: the metal-bending M&A muttonheads have likely inflicted irreparable damage to VMware, the best asset in the so-called “federation”. Pivotal also risks being caught up in financial shenanigans perpetrated by those who neither understand nor appreciate software.

DevOps: if you’re buying DevOps tools, you’re doing it wrong.

Digital Ocean: needs to make its play as the dark horse window is closing.

Docker: despite all the political hijinks as competitors tried to box Docker in, Docker has become boring. That is good; the container infrastructure continues to mature. More exciting perhaps are new developer models emerging that are “native” to containers.

GitHub: the Craigslist of cloud?

HubSpot: this is not cloudy, but given the infrequency of my blogging, I will predict their CEO steps down in 2016 with p = .7. The board may follow. The level of transparency has not yet become “uncomfortable”. But it will.

Industry Foundations: after an ugly outbreak of industry foundations last year, we can only hope to be certified Foundation-free in 2016. As we have seen, this affliction is highly contagious. As with cockroaches, when you see one foundation, you will likely see more. So it is important to prevent potential foundation epidemics; the best protection is not letting companies that can’t write code get involved.

PaaS: still a zero billion dollar market though the data is suggesting I might finally have to stop using that line next year. Perhaps more importantly, containers have reinvigorated the endless ontological debate about what exactly constitutes a PaaS. Cloud Foundry is having some success selling to very large enterprises, but they seem to be selling hope more than product. The Fortune 500 is packed with companies grasping for anything that lets them believe they can become software companies.

OpenStack: like a poorly performing European football team, OpenStack has been relegated to a lower division. It is now a solution for telcos. As the saying goes, if at first you don’t succeed, you can still sell it to telcos. OpenStack is a great fit with the NFV misdirection, which gives telcos the infrastructure toys everyone else had a decade ago while leaving the networking crown jewels firmly in vendor hands.

(Free) Stock Tips: if wave one of the cloud disruption hit enterprise hardware, wave two is hitting enterprise software. VMware preemptively tubed its stock by letting itself be the funny business in the Dell-EMC deal, so it not clear how much more downside there is in VMW. Oracle’s stock has already started to roll over. But there is still time to short Red Hat who, despite being irrelevant to cloud, sports a multiple of over 75 yet will see a much smaller fraction of every dollar that shifts to the cloud. If you have a cloud infrastructure software company to sell, Red Hat is your first call.

Tweetstorm Digest: May 19, 2015

Lest you missed a bit of a @charlesfitz victory lap for Cloud City (Seattle) on Twitter:

1/ A geographic look at the Gartner Magic Quadrant for Cloud is revealing:

GeoMQ

2/ The Leader quadrant for cloud computing shall henceforth be known as the Seattle quadrant.

3/ Seattle has also annexed the best real estate in the visionaries quadrant.

4/ Yes, Google does their cloud infrastructure work in Seattle.

5/ The MQ has more companies from south of the Mason-Dixon line than from Silicon Valley.

6/ VMware (wedged in there like Oklahoma) is Silicon Valley’s champion, almost by default.

7/ The Cloud BS Brigade of Silicon Valley BigCos (Cisco, HP, Oracle) only appear in their own press releases.

Bonus: a fun timelapse of how this Magic Quadrant has evolved over the last five years.

AWS and the Bonfire of Amazon’s Vanities

The Bonfire of the Vanities

TL;DR – It is time for Amazon Web Services to get out of Amazon

A recent interview with Amazon Web Services’ chieftain Andy Jassy repeatedly touts the “trillion dollar opportunity” associated with the inexorable transition of enterprise IT to the cloud. Perhaps because his interlocutor was so busy inserting himself into the interview, Jassy isn’t actually quoted uttering the T-word (although he does manage to land “TAM”). But he certainly isn’t refuting the notion there are thirteen orders of magnitude associated with the Enterprise Cloud Jackpot (and I use Jackpot in a thoroughly non-Gibsonian way, though legacy vendors may see it apocalyptically). As the cloud computing leader today, AWS is in the pole position for this tectonic shift. The question is whether being part of Amazon going forward is on balance more help or hindrance to AWS winning their fair share of the Jackpot.

Amazon obviously was able to conceive, nurture and build a heretical idea into AWS today. It is inconceivable any traditional IT vendor could have done this and hard to imagine other candidates with comparable wherewithal and “willingness to be misunderstood”. But we’re past the point of being misunderstood. Pretty much everyone now accepts that vast chunks of IT are shifting to the cloud (with the notable exception, admittedly, of legions of enterprise IT people clinging to their servers in a desperate bid to preserve the status quo). Even the biggest technology dinosaurs now recognize that the incoming cloud meteor is a potential extinction event.

AWS continues to innovate and execute well. Their near and medium-term success is not in doubt. But being part of Amazon raises questions about their ability to fully capture the big prize. Can they achieve generational dominance a la IBM or Microsoft in their primes? Will they be one major player among several? Or does their early lead whither away? Being part of Amazon brings benefits, but also significant baggage, specifically difficulty concentrating, having sufficient cash to compete and adverse cultural factors.

Concentration

Big as it is in its own right, AWS is a relatively small part of Amazon and gets lumped into their glamorous “Other” segment, which did $5.6B in 2014 (about 6% of Amazon’s overall $89B in revenue). Notably, “Other” was the fastest growing segment at 42% vs. 20% for the company overall. The Amazon-branded credit card gets cited as another occupant of “Other”, but our grasp of the AWS business remains tenuous.

Beyond the trillion dollar Enterprise Cloud Jackpot, Amazon’s core e-commerce business still has tremendous upside. E-commerce in the US last year was over $300 billion and but only 6.5% of overall retail sales. Amazon takes an expansive view of the ecommerce business, investing in drone and local delivery, a broad line of consumer hardware for direct distribution of digital goods, a robot army and private label brands for everything from diapers to TV shows.

In contrast to Apple who says “no” by default, when confronted by new opportunities Amazon seemingly leaps up on the table and screams “Yes! Yes! Yes!” Their bonfire of initiatives has resulted in some notable and expensive misfires of late, including the disappearing Kindle Fire, the disastrous Fire Phone and the under-heralded Fire Diaper blowout And the jury is still out on Fire TV, the not-exactly-setting-the-world-on-fire Echo Fire, The Man on Fire in the High Castle, WorkMail Fire, and “hair on fire” one hour delivery amongst other efforts. And, for completeness, this is an AWS Fire.

It can be argued the company has poor impulse control, is fighting too many battles on too many fronts and must allocate cash, talent and attention across a very wide range. Amazon’s historical “willingness to be misunderstood” and success in defying past criticism (to which I hereby add my name to a long list) don’t do anything to suggest new restraint is imminent. This scattershot approach may make sense before product-market fit, but AWS is beyond that point. Many of these other activities are a distraction given AWS is chasing a plausibly trillion dollar market.

Cash

Cloud computing is not for the light of wallet, requiring many billions of dollars to build cavernous datacenters scattered around the planet, stuffed with millions of servers. GigaOm breaks down last year’s capex spending by the big players:

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Now these numbers aren’t pure apples to apples comparisons. Amazon’s capex also goes to erect even more cavernous e-commerce distribution centers with “more than 15,000 robots in 10 fulfillment centers across the U.S.” Google and Microsoft both spend big on search infrastructure, and Google’s numbers include YouTube, flotillas of automotive, sea-going, aerial and space-faring vehicles, and based on the sheer magnitude, maybe the odd space elevator.

For comparison (and in lieu of a much-delayed “So You Want to be a Cloud Wanna-be” post with etiquette and strategy tips for cloud also-rans), here are similar period capex numbers for some of the cloud wanna-bes and their growth (or lack thereof) over the preceding year as they try to play catch-up:

 

CAPEX (TTM)

Growth over 2013

HP

$956M

+4%

IBM

$3,779M

0%

Oracle

$727M

26%

Rackspace

$430M

-5%

VMware

$352M

2%

(These are the budgets from which bonsai datacenters are built).

Meanwhile, returning from Lilliput, Amazon has the shortest stack at the grown-up table, with $17.4 billion in liquid assets to Google’s $64.4 billion and Microsoft’s $90.2 billion. Google in particular intends to push Amazon to the wall financially, though it was Bill Gates who said, “Never get into a price war with someone who has more money than you.” Amazon has notably lost its prior enthusiasm for price cuts and obliquely grouses about networking costs where Google and Microsoft have a huge advantage in terms of facilities.

It has always been a bit of a mystery how Amazon could serve more cloud computing customers, spend less than Google or Microsoft and support aggressive build-outs of both datacenters and distribution centers. The assumption was search required significantly more infrastructure and/or Amazon was just somehow more efficient. But we’ve recently learned that Amazon has used capital leases to keep billions in capital spending off their cash flow statement. So their capital spending is closer to double what has been reported. This means their free cash flow, the metric they have relentlessly told investors is the key lens onto the company, is actually negative and declining in recent years (remember this: we’ll revisit it below when we talk about employee recruiting and retention).

It is an easy quip as a low margin retailer to say “your margin is my opportunity” but you still have to pay for your datacenters. Every dollar spent on half-baked consumer hardware (or worse, doubling down on a failed consumer hardware brand) or random TV shows, or giant distribution centers and bright yellow robots to support the core e-commerce business, is a dollar that isn’t going to AWS. And Amazon must continue to invest significantly in its core e-commerce business, whether defined narrowly or broadly.

Culture

It is an open secret, at least in Seattle and amongst top tier technology firms, that not many people enjoy working at Amazon. Many companies have come north to open offices (e.g. DropBox, Facebook, Palantir, Salesforce, Twitter) and usually say they are there to lure talent from Microsoft. Yet with the notable exception of recent SoCal immigrants Oculus and SpaceX who are on Microsoft’s side of the lake, most choose to locate their offices a stone’s throw from Amazon’s campus.

Amazon relies heavily on its stock for both recruiting and retention. They pay below market salaries, offer signing bonuses that pay out over the first two years and after that rely on stock to both carry the compensation load and overcome the drawbacks of the work environment. Independent of stock performance, you see a lot of Amazon resumes on the street as soon as the signing bonuses are paid out.

Amazon’s stock price obviously reflects perceptions of the company broadly. It has been run as a profitless machine yet been richly valued for most of its history. Skepticism has emerged over the last year or two about whether the company will ever get out of “investment mode” and focus on financial returns. Amazon turned in a strong Q4 including an unexpected profit (they have conditioned Wall Street well…) which popped the stock by over 25%, but it still trades below its all-time high even as the rest of the market hits record highs.

Amazon has guided investors to focus on its free cash flow as opposed to profits. Yet they felt the need to more explicitly call out the significant use of capital leases in their most recent earning call, which had heretofore been buried and largely ignored amongst the footnotes. The free cash flow picture looks very different, in both magnitude and trend, when these leases are considered:

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And note this debt is being incurred today at unprecedentedly low interest rates, a phenomenon that is unlikely to continue much longer.

AWS is growing fast and needs to continue to hire rapidly as it chases the Jackpot. Dependence on Amazon’s stock, and the company’s ability to sell Wall Street on anything-but-profit metrics, adds risk to their ability to recruit and retain. AWS also needs to build a culture that can meet enterprise customer expectations and that culture surely looks different than today’s Amazon.

For example, Amazon’s secrecy fetish and chronic inability to put numbers on the y-axis of charts is inconsistent with need to provide long-term roadmaps for customers contemplating taking enormous dependencies on AWS. The secretive culture alienates a whole range of useful hires for AWS. Further, Amazon the retailer gets confused about what it means to be a platform company. AWS has generally done a decent job walking this fine line (and platforms and their ecosystems are never static, which is a topic for another day) but a deft touch in nurturing the ecosystem is critical to AWS’s future success.

Set the Cloud Free

On balance, I think AWS would be better positioned to realize the opportunities in front of it as an independent company, away from the vanities and vicissitudes of Amazon.

A full spinout of AWS from Amazon or even a partial IPO a la VMware would establish a focused entity that can single-mindedly pursue the Jackpot, with its own culture and compensation model. Amazon can stake the new company and the transparency associated with being a pure play chasing a $1 trillion TAM should give it the opportunity to raise all the money it needs to compete, especially while growth is still in the mid double digits. More distance from Amazon would also help AWS land more customers. Many large retailers consider AWS verboten and as Amazon’s sprawl continues, that competitive dynamic could impact AWS’s ability to sell to media, consumer products and other industries.

A spinout of AWS may already be in progress. Amazon announced it will start disclosing AWS numbers this year, which could be a first step. These numbers will be scrutinized every which way and will be fascinating to see. We could learn that it is AWS’s capex specifically that is being capitalized and thus intended to be portable. Rumors also suggest AWS gets far less attention from the chief product designer and octopus taster at Amazon.

Will AWS still be part of Amazon in two years?

Book Review: Whiskey Tango Foxtrot

The latest in digital technology and Big Data in particular are increasingly fodder for novelists. Whiskey Tango Foxtrot by David Shafer is a wry story of mostly earnest millennials who end up in “pitched battle with a fascist consortium of data miners”. The Google–esque bad guys are too nerdy and tone-deaf to achieve full-on Bond villain status, but Google is inexorably becoming the template for the next generation of thriller/movie villains (after The Interview, the only villains left seem to be evil corporations lest we offend even the most backward of movie-going audiences and/or their hereditary dictators, although they pale in comparison with classic villains in their menace, reach and ambition).

Shafer has some great turns of phrase in addition to exploring the dark side of Big Data:

They call it the cloud, but that’s wrong, isn’t it? Their cloud is heavy and metal and whirring.

But maybe that’s not how life works at all. Maybe you’re not supposed to put up so much resistance. Maybe a lot of that is pride and ego and pointless in the end. In which case she’d been misled by all that required reading and by the Die Hard movies.

Besides, there is the scrape of luck in everything, from the missed bus, to the dinged chromosome, to the hurtling asteroid.

“Why the hell would you be collecting shit like this?” Mark said, looking straight at Cole. “It’s public. It’s over our network. We call dibs on it.” Dibs? They were calling dibs? “But it’s illegal, to spy on people like this.” “Information is free. Storage is unlimited,” said Cole, totally unbothered. “Our privacy policy is reviewed regularly, and our mandate to collect is spelled out in the implied-consent decree of 2001. We’re just keeping this stuff safe, anyway. The other server giants have terrible vulnerabilities; they could be erased so easily.” Did he just smirk? “But that’s not really my department.”

“And what is the product, exactly?” asked Mark, a little desperately. “It’s a product and a service,” said Straw proudly. “It’s order. It’s the safeguarding of all of our clients’ personal information and assets. But it may be a while before our clients discover that they are our clients.”

“And yes, right now this part runs up against something called the ‘right to privacy’”—she made air quotes—“which is a notion that hasn’t really meant much in thirty years and means less every day. You may as well defend people’s right to own steamboats. Someone’s going to control access to all the data and all the knowledge. All of it. Everything that every government, every company, and every poor schmuck needs to get through the day. You want that to be the other guys? Once everyone’s on our network, the old, unwired world will be worthless.”

Tweetstorm Digest: January 26, 2015

Lest you missed an @charlesfitz Twitter excepting of a (paradigmatically paywalled) Goldman Sachs report “The Hardware Download” dated January 20, 2015:

1/ Missed a good Goldman Sachs report on cloud last week with focus on “the cloud’s impact on IBM”. Good CIO/VAR survey data.

2/ VAR survey “How has migration of your customer’s workloads to the public cloud impacted spending on infrastructure companies?”

3/ Positive responses minus negative responses: SAP +44, MSFT +40, RHT +35, VMW +6, CTXS -36, ORCL -50, IBM -74 (!)

4/ CIO survey shows $RAX a bigger player in the race for the enterprise public cloud jackpot than $GOOG

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5/ “many investors are focused on IBM’s ability to counter many of these secular pressures with its investments in cloud platforms”

6/ “the early read from our team’s surveys suggest much work is still needed in this respect”

7/ GS coyly concludes: “IBM’s infrastructure software sales could be seeing more pressure than peers with migration to public cloud.”