Tag Archives: Microsoft

Ballmer vs. Chambers: A Corporate Cage Match

Amidst adding Cisco to Dinosaur Row, I asked someone “If Steve Ballmer got run off by Wall Street, how does John Chambers still have a job?”

Both are/were long-tenured, non-founder CEOs of two of the biggest technology companies. Both have presided over erosion of prior dominance during the course of the 21st century, even as revenues and profits kept growing. Neither has been shy about making sweeping calls about the future, yet their predictions have stubbornly refused to come to pass. Both found themselves increasingly reacting to rather then driving key industry trends (although Ballmer will eventually get credit for not missing cloud computing, which is coming for Cisco, even as Chambers continues to ply ye olde enterprise playbook in response). Ballmer’s tenure as CEO began January 1, 2000 while Chambers took the CEO chair in January 1995.

I’ve related this story before, but Steve was acutely aware of the consequences of taking office almost exactly at the top of the dot com bubble. He would bellow, not proudly, that “I’ve lost more market cap than any CEO in history”. After a couple years, he could amend that with “Thank god for John Chambers”.

Lets look at their performance during their shared tenure (January 1, 2000 to February 4, 2014). Revenue and profits are generally up and to the right, but stock performance is negative – presumably their future performance was already priced into the stocks. Microsoft’s total return is better with all the dividends, but still in the red over Ballmer’s tenure.

Total Return: Advantage Ballmer (Microsoft -15.3% vs. Cisco -56.8% )

CSCO Total Return Price Chart

CSCO Total Return Price data by YCharts

Market Capitalization: Advantage Ballmer (Microsoft -49.7% vs. Cisco -68.2%)

CSCO Market Cap Chart

CSCO Market Cap data by YCharts

Revenue Growth: Advantage Ballmer (Microsoft +333.5% vs. Cisco +156%)

CSCO Revenue (Quarterly) Chart

CSCO Revenue (Quarterly) data by YCharts

Profit Growth: Advantage Ballmer (Microsoft +175% vs. Cisco 75.12%)

CSCO Net Income (Quarterly) Chart

CSCO Net Income (Quarterly) data by YCharts

Bigendian Suit: Advantage Chambers

John Chambers, chairman and chief executive officer of Cisco Systems

(A picture of Steve in his red v-neck sweater — or worse, forthcoming Los Angeles “America’s Team” Clippers garb — is omitted as a matter of common courtesy).

Now you may say “but lets look at Chambers’ full tenure”, as he assumed the big boy chair five years before Ballmer. And you’re welcome to do that, even in our what have you done for me lately culture, but the record is uglier than that of the much derided Microsoft (I won’t even start digging up all those acquisitions everyone has rightly forgotten about). Will Chambers declare victory and head for the exits before the future pain becomes more evident at Cisco, or will he overstay his welcome until the hounds of Wall Street start baying for his head? Stay tuned. And then we can have a discussion about whether Cisco’s next CEO should be a product guy or another sales guy…

Tweetstorm Digest: July 10, 2014

Reprising today’s @charlesfitz Tweetstorm:

1\ Some quick reactions to @satyanadella morning Microsoft missive (sprawling, like the company).

2\ A first step to answering the biggest question about the company: why does it exist beyond just perpetuating its past?

3\ Shift from vapid (realizing potential) or means (devices & services, cloud-first/mobile-first) to end (productivity) is long overdue.

4\ Company has been at a loss wrt mission since achieving BHAG of computer on every desk and in every home.

5\ Productivity is Microsoft’s core but still some awkward stretching to cover full portfolio

6\ Still waiting for major deviation – addition or deletion – from Ballmer’s Microsoft. Bing and Xbox not going away (and rightly so).

7\ HailStorm vision is back: individual as hub for all the technologies in their life. Should have done it a decade ago.

8\ Microsoft’s disastrous embrace of the ad economy remains unresolved (devalued personal computing franchise, got none of the upside).

9\ Privacy paeans weaker than Apple; lumping with security feels like afterthought. Privacy path fundamental question for company.

10\ Still no answers for the Windows business, Company must pivot from personal computer to personal computing.

11\ More changes coming soon, including probably some layoffs. Marketing rationalization has been deferred for long time.

12\ My preference is still to break the company up. Would unlock a lot of value.

13\ Satya continues to endear himself to literate press with literary references ;-)

(Somehow periods seem more necessary here).

A Dispatch from Cloud City

A few end of the year observations from Cloud City (aka Seattle):

Cloud Infrastructure

  • AWS remains a beast. Yet a chink in their armor is emerging…
  • Azure has become the clear challenger to AWS. The much maligned Mr. Ballmer is not getting credit for Microsoft’s embrace and execution on cloud. Unlike most of its cohorts rooted (mired?) in previous generations of technology, Microsoft is well on its way to making the cloud transition.
  • Despite very strong technology and an impressive operational footprint, Google Cloud Platform is still a hobby for Google. They are as yet unwilling to make the necessary non-technology investments to really compete to win here.
  • Private infrastructure clouds just aren’t happening – instead enterprises are both getting more comfortable (surrendering?) with public cloud and continuing to invest in virtualization (VMware obituaries were definitely premature).
  • OpenStack’s identity crisis is warranted. Without a credible ecosystem of OpenStack-based public cloud providers and little enterprise private cloud adoption, the OpenStack bandwagon is left providing ingredient technology to the industry itself, which doesn’t really need what the vendors are selling.
  • Rackspace’s OpenStack bet outcome is increasingly clear: they may not exit 2014 as an independent entity. They should have invested up the stack in higher value services like Amazon, not down (and to add insult to injury, I’ll wager their VMware business still is bigger than their OpenStack business). They’ve lost over half of their market cap this year. While they still sport a premium multiple, the overall trend is towards a SoftLayer kind of valuation which could put them in play for acquisition by the kind of legacy vendors who confuse hosting with cloud (isn’t HP out telling the world their balance sheet has finally recovered from Autonomy?).

Cloud Platform

  • PaaS is still a zero billion dollar category, but could PaaS end up being the level at which enterprises implement private cloud? I see more traction for PaaS than IaaS in the enterprise.

Big Data

  • In the absence of a strong set of customer successes, I think Hadoop may be spending some time in the trough of disillusionment. The challenge is not filling the data lake, the challenge is extracting meaningful and material business results from the lake. It is a data science problem far more than an infrastructure problem. How long will it take to transition to a Hadoop 2 that is robust, deployable, performance, has ecosystem support, etc.?
  • I continue to be amused that Google is so far ahead when it comes to big data that it is a material disadvantage for them. They get dismissed as proprietary while the rest of the industry is enraptured with Google’s technology from two generations back that has been awkwardly laundered through Yahoo.

What else is happening below the clouds on the ground?

Exploring Alternative History

Tablet circa the year 2000

Bloomberg has a nice piece revisiting the broad vision Microsoft laid out in June 2000 at the grandiosely named Forum 2000. They even have an edited cut of some of the scenario videos developed for the event to bring the vision to life.

The event was originally scheduled to open the new millennium in January with a bang and more importantly to lay out Microsoft’s vision for the 21st century. The company felt intense pressure to reassert its thought leadership on at least three fronts. Microsoft, by virtue of being a business with actual profits, probably had an even greater relevance problem during the height of the dot com mania than it does today. Second, the unrelenting antirust assault on the company was building to its climax and the company desperately wanted an alternative narrative. And, largely forgotten today, the company was very concerned about demonstrating it would not lose a step in the transition to its brand new CEO, one Steven A. Ballmer, who had just taken the reins from Bill Gates.

The event was pushed from January to March and then ultimately June because the dates kept overlapping with antitrust rulings. That event kicked off a train of events that lead us directly to Microsoft’s current situation and the search for a new leader. It definitely provides a glimpse of a different trajectory for Microsoft over the last decade.

The original process to define Microsoft’s forward vision was through a set of technical committees made up of Microsoft’s best and brightest technologists. Despite high hopes and leaks to the press that such a process was under way, this approach was pretty much a complete bust. As that became apparent, Steve asked Paul Maritz to oversee an effort to pull together a compelling vision for the company. Paul described this exercise as “creating a new parade”.  A small and fairly eclectic group was formed of people from across the company but largely outside the engineering ranks. We sketched out the broad attributes of what things going forward would look like and then five sub-teams were tasked with making this brave new world come alive for consumers, small business, enterprises, knowledge workers and an end-to-end healthcare scenario that illustrated what developers would be able to build. Each group scripted and then shot professional quality videos from the user perspective.

I don’t think people appreciate how close Microsoft came to completely imploding in 2000. Employees woke up every day to relentlessly negative headlines from the DoJ case. It was not yet evident that the surreal world of the dot com bubble had ended, and even if you weren’t being wooed daily to join revenue-less startups with ridiculous valuations, you felt obligated to explore options.

Forum 2000 changed all that internally. It provided a sense of purpose and showed how the whole could be greater than the sum of the parts. Soon after Forum 2000, Mark Lucovsky, one of the key contributors to Windows NT, the inventor of Win32 (he also likes to brag he invented “DLL Hell”) and one of the company’s distinguished engineers, showed up with an architecture to make the Forum 2000 videos real (the ability to actually implement had not been the foremost consideration in painting the vision…). This lead to .NET My Services (aka hailStorm) which was announced in the spring of 2001.

.NET My Services was a cloud-centric model using web services to deliver consistent, personalized experiences across a wide variety of devices (including non-Microsoft devices – the very first device demonstrated was a Palm). It was also an API-first model, which meant any endpoint could access the system (this is an approach the Facebooks and Twitters claim, but regularly violate in the name of “protecting the user experience” which really means protecting ad revenue). It was a major departure from Microsoft’s traditional PC-centric platform and also introduced a subscription business model as opposed to the traditional license model. It was an open platform accessible from any device or service through open XML-based protocols but could be bootstrapped using Microsoft’s vast footprint of devices, applications and services. It represented a fundamental shift to a service-centric world, both technically and in terms of business model.

By 2001, it was clearer that the dot com mania had been a giant bubble and wasn’t coming back, plus the appeals court ruled that Microsoft would survive the antitrust proceedings intact. The confidence stemming from these positive external factors, however, ultimately undermined Microsoft’s desire to invest and realize the new vision.

Competitors like Sun Microsystems, no doubt horrified that their years of lobbying had failed to hobble the company, now faced a revitalized Microsoft with a vision for the future that was compelling to customers and driving the industry discussion. When they probably should have been figuring out how to save a business shackled to the dot com ship, Sun embarked upon a very effective campaign of demagoguery around Microsoft leading the shift to a user-centric model. As a result, My Services ushered in the first big industry debate around identity and privacy in the cloud. In retrospect, Microsoft’s personal computing heritage and fundamentally user-centric approach to give users full control over how their data would be shared looks vastly superior to today’s world administered by the almost interchangeable Big Brothers of Facebook, Google and NSA.

With the competitive and existential threats from dot coms and the DoJ having abated by this time, Microsoft chickened out on seeing it through. It was easy to back down from the industry debate over identity, shirk the challenges of figuring out the subscription service model and revert to the comfort and familiarity of good old Windows and Office. Harvard Business School later did an interesting case on the tensions between the old and the new camps inside the company and how it played out.

I don’t think it is widely appreciated that WinFS was born of a desire to realize the My Services scenarios, but to do it in a Windows-centric way. There was broad agreement on the importance of the scenarios, but strategic nostalgia for Windows resulted in the company trying to rethread them through the franchise and revisit the eternal dream of integrated storage. Instead of the truth being in the cloud, the truth would reside on Windows and everything would have to sync with your PC (just don’t turn your laptop off…). This decision triggered a sequence of events that directly brings us to the present day where the erosion of the Windows franchise played no small role in Steve Ballmer’s departure,

My Services was shut down, with CTO and WinFS cheerleader David Vaskevitch dismissively telling the team the company “didn’t need another $500 million business”. The fixation on WinFS technology brought down Longhorn, the release of Windows scheduled to follow Windows XP. Simply put, WinFS was too ambitious technically. After much internal debate, Longhorn came to an end with the “Longhorn Reset” whereupon the company embarked on the far less ambitious Windows Vista (and WinFS was never to be seen again, although I have flashbacks when I listen to the Hadoop guys talk today). However, given it had been over five years since Windows XP had shipped, the company felt pressure to rush the product out the door to meet obligations to customers who had paid for a new version of Windows as part of their enterprise agreements. Hence the “Vistaster” of shipping a half-baked version of Windows.

The company then spent three more years cleaning up the quality, performance, haphazard user experience and packaging of Vista, resulting in the very solid Windows 7, but failing to move the PC industry forward in any material way during that time. Windows XP remained the most popular version of Windows and Microsoft was forced multiple times to extend the end of life of Windows XP by a customer base that was just not compelled by multiple subsequent releases.

Meanwhile, iPhone and iPad (and imitators like Android) were in market and Microsoft’s Post-PC nightmare was looking very real. The company decided to focus Windows 8 almost exclusively on tablets, hoping to pull the tablet category back into the PC universe. Except that didn’t happen. Windows 8 on tablets received mixed reviews. Surface was a costly mistake, both financially and in its impact on critical OEM relationships. And it screwed up the desktop experience for billions of PC users (one senior Microsoft executive told me Windows 8 was only for tablets, but didn’t answer my question of why they neglected to mention that in the advertising). Which brings us to the present and the search for a new CEO.

In retrospect, this sequence of events is crystal clear in a way it never is in the fog of the present. Even with greater commitment, there are a million other ways the Forum 2000 vision could have gone wrong. Parts of the vision were dead on, others such as assuming tablets would rely on a stylus were big misses. It was still predicated on bootstrapping from the current Microsoft installed base, which would force a myriad of tradeoffs between old and new every day. There were major business challenges to overcome in building a successful subscription business, particularly as the Google advertising revenue volcano was just beginning to erupt. Microsoft subsequently spent years drooling over the prospect of hundreds of billions of dollars of advertising moving online, without fully internalizing that capturing those revenues would require behavior that was in many ways antithetical to the personal computing ethos at the core of the company. The good news is the rise of the tablet kept Microsoft from turning Windows into an ad-funded desktop billboard monstrosity.

The Price of Success

And of course, Microsoft faced the innovator’s dilemma in spades. The last decade of Microsoft’s history is a classic and very public case study on how a very successful company deals with disruption (disruption it knows is coming). The dissipation of the Forum 2000 vision was very much the result of a battle between seemingly reactionary forces exercising their fiduciary responsibilities and the hazy dreamers of a less distinct and unproven future. The counter-revolution obviously prevailed, at least temporarily.

Some have even argued that Microsoft did the right thing by maximizing Windows profits for as long as it did (and is still doing even though Windows profits dipped slightly below $10 billion in the last fiscal year). Horace Dediu’s recent podcast “The Limits of Executive Power” has an interesting take on this (and smart commentary recently on Microsoft is hard to find):

We begin with a defense of Ballmer for preserving great things, continue by condemning him for not having destroyed those very same things and end by asking whether anyone could have done the right thing.

The Innovator’s Dilemma came out in 1997. We all read it at Microsoft and were looking for disruption behind every tree. Discussions about the need to cannibalize Windows before someone else did have been going on for at least 15 years. And in the meantime, the company has banked profits from Windows alone in excess of $100 billion (I have not done the actual math but the number is of this order of magnitude). Clearly undermining that profit stream proactively 15 years ago was the wrong thing to do, but how should the company have avoided its current situation? The company invested in pretty much every kind of non-PC device including smartphones (Microsoft was the leader in this space as recently as 2006), tablets (albeit with styluses) and a bunch of goofier form factors.

I believe the fundamental problem was the unwillingness and/or inability to transcend the single device (UPDATE: I should make explicit that this is a reference to Tim O’Reilly’s popularization of Dave Stutz’s farewell from Microsoft missive which was written after the My Services experience). Microsoft had the vision and means to both lead the industry and bridge its existing businesses to a cloud-centric, multi-device world, but failed to follow through. Now it finds itself belatedly embracing this model but from a disadvantaged position. It is yet another technology industry example of innovations conceived in one place being successfully commercialized elsewhere that lacks the baggage of the conceiver.

Near the end of my tenure at Microsoft, I was in a meeting with a cast of thousands. One of the presenters said “we wouldn’t want to do another hailStorm”, expecting all the heads in the room to nod in unison. The SVP in the room turned to me and said “we should have done hailStorm” to which my answer was “damn straight”. The rest of the room was aghast. I suspect this viewpoint is not as contentious now, even at the board level. Success can be a bitch.

Looking Ahead

Sayonara

With the initial frenzy around the great Ballmer succession sweepstakes slowing down, lets look ahead at how things may play out:

Timing

I can’t believe this will take 12 months to resolve or that the company can afford to let it drag on that long. If the board can’t find a new CEO in three months, they’re never going to find someone. My guess is they shoot for an announcement around November with a January start date for new guy. Overlap between old and new CEOs is fraught with issues, so my guess is Steve will get an extremely well-deserved and complete summer vacation next year. UPDATE: the fact ValueAct doesn’t get its board seat until early next year is another impetus to get this decision made before then.

Candidates

I speculated discretely a little here, but am stunned at some of the crazy names in play. How does a company like Ladbrokes stay in business if this is an example of their handicapping skills? Does anyone know how to arbitrage this insanity? And where is Harold Stassen in this race?

I said earlier there was really only one internal candidate. After more thought, I now think there are two but the second one is not showing up in all the speculation (which is really surprising because this puts him in the minority it seems of Microsoft employees).

The Re-org

I maintain my earlier (and evidently not safe for publication) claim that the ongoing functional reorganization is batshit crazy. It was crazy with Steve, but it is barking mad with an unknown new leader showing up at some indeterminate time in the future. But the company can’t go back to the old model at this point and has to keep marching ahead in the absence of any other option. I guess they keep implementing this re-org until the new CEO unveils the next re-org. In the meantime, between a lame duck CEO and the groping-in-the-dark of the current re-org, Microsoft is largely on hold strategically (which makes it all the more important to find the new leader quickly).

Breakup

The uncertain transition period and ongoing re-org to greater centralization actually make it harder to break the company up into the “Svelte Steves”, but this is still the right solution for Microsoft’s existential plight. Hopefully the board will realize after interviewing a bunch of candidates that there isn’t anyone likely to manage the sprawling software conglomerate that is Microsoft today any better than Steve and they should break the company up, create a more focused set of companies and unlock substantial value.

Layoffs

I hate to say it, but these seem almost inevitable upon the arrival of whoever comes next. Every new CEO wants to get bad news out of the way while they can still implicitly (or explicitly) blame their predecessor. And I think one of the big motivations for the recent re-org was to “increase marketing efficiencies”. Microsoft laid off a couple hundred marketing people last year, but rumor is the original target was ten times higher. This has implications for local hiring and the Seattle real estate market if nothing else.

Executive Departures

Just as we saw an exodus of “Bill guys” after Steve took over, there are some “Steve guys” that it is hard to imagine being part of any new regime. Kevin Turner would be one (and for anyone wagering on KT as the next CEO of Microsoft, I will take the other side of that bet for every penny you want to put down). Mark Penn, who still lives in the other Washington, may  suddenly discover Hillary’s 2016 campaign is ramping up (perhaps they will have forgotten his prior contributions). And there are some of Steve’s Pro Club basketball buddies with their brogrammer bonhomie (except they lack even brogrammer-level programming chops) whose career trajectories could be impacted. Who else is busy updating their LinkedIn profile (beyond every marketing employee at the company)?

NBA Basketball Returning to Seattle

Steve can get busy on this front, just as our archenemy the hated and despised David Stern exits the scene. Steve would be a great owner (and cheerleader – every home game will like MGX to him), a la Mark Cuban. Others have suggested Steve could also help salvage his home town of Detroit.

What else should we expect on the Microsoft front as this transition plays out?

Filling Big Shoes

Big Big Shoes by tom@hk | 湯米tomhk, on Flickr
Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic License  via Flickr 

There is a lesson in the all-around thrashing Steve Ballmer has received in recent days about filling the shoes of the greats: don’t.

Anyone who succeeds one of the greats -– be it Bill Gates, Steve Jobs, Jack Welch, Peter Lynch, Warren Buffett, Michael Jordan or Peter the Great -– is likely to suffer by comparison. As general career advice, there is more downside than upside to following a legend.

You may be as or even more skilled than the superstar you’re following, but they also likely had both good luck and timing on their side. The tailwinds that favored them probably won’t keep blowing for you. Nothing lasts forever. The rules change. The great bull market eventually comes to an end. Low draft picks erode your bench. The competitors keep coming and coming, and unlike you, they often have nothing to lose. The window for breakthrough innovation in your industry may not stay open 24×7. Cambrian explosions can be followed by long periods of unpunctuated equilibrium. No small part of becoming a legend is successfully getting out on top (cf. Michael Dell).

And your predecessor’s success increases degree of difficulty you face. It sets expectations for your performance, yet there are real diseconomies associated with success. You get to defend the substantial realm your predecessor built. That scale and scope of success brings complexity. You inherit a valuation that presumes your future trajectory; you really only can screw it up. Sheer size means you move markets. Opposing teams always get up for the game when the defending champions come to town, even if there have been roster changes. The key lieutenants who had the legend’s back may decide it is time to enjoy their rewards. You’re an easy target for populists, contrarians and anyone who wants to stick it to ‘the man’. The press, who first build you up, inevitably get bored and will decide it is time to tear you down. A government or two may shake you down for campaign contributions, directly or indirectly.

A big part of Steve’s problem is he isn’t Bill. He’s had to manage the house that Bill built in the face of unprecedented government assault, the complete collapse (and rebirth) of the tech sector and try to keep up with, much less stay ahead of the incessant march of technology. Steve is a amazingly successful and accomplished guy, contrary to what you may conclude from the twenty-something blogger consensus this week. It isn’t clear anyone, including Bill, could manage the sprawling empire that is Microsoft today or have maintained Microsoft’s dominance in the serendipitous world of technology up to the present day. I wish Steve’s last move had been to break the company up (and frankly, there is still time for that). It would be better for the company and for his legacy.

But it isn’t just Steve who has this problem. Tim Cook is experiencing all the joys of not being Steve Jobs. Ballmer’s buddy Jeff Immelt soldiers on at GE, having started at a similarly awkward time of high valuations (GE has dropped a couple hundred billion in market cap on his watch). Peter Lynch’s Fidelity Magellan Fund, where at least the first couple managers to follow Lynch made headlines, is largely forgotten today. And I won’t invest any money with whoever eventually takes the reins from Warren Buffett (whose own best performance came when he was investing much much smaller amounts). Pete Myers, of course, had a career year and lead the Bulls to a 55 win season after MJ retired (the first time), but the Bulls didn’t win another championship. Peter the Great continues to cast a long shadow unbroken by any Russian leader in the ensuing centuries (except maybe Stalin, but he was more from the Ivan the Terrible school).

Mean reversion is a bitch, and mean reversion from an extreme outlier can be even more painful. Put another way: bet against the guy who comes after the legend.

Note: I leave Larry Ellison off this list of examples. Due to the fact he intends to live forever, he will spare any successor the ordeal of following him.

A Handicapper’s Guide

 
With the announcement that SteveB will depart within the year, there is all kinds of speculation about his successor, much of it ranging between vapid and nutty. There are three classes of candidate:

Internal Candidates

While people are having fun going through every headshot of the Senior Leadership Team as a possible CEO candidate, there really is only one internal candidate. This candidate would be a strong vote for continuity. The next CEO of Microsoft will be in Redmond and won’t be a connoisseur of corndogs.

External Candidates

Microsoft is historically very tough on executives hired from outside and succeeding Steve would be exceptionally challenging. Given Microsoft could have almost anyone, there are not a lot of obvious candidates here. Would love to hear suggestions as I am sure there are some out-of-the-box candidates I have not considered. Gray-faced/gray suited enterprise executives seem unlikely, and especially not anyone who ever worked at HP or IBM (internships should not be disqualifiers).

Alumni Candidates

This is the most interesting category (at least for us alumni ;-). There are a number of names that have been tossed around: KJ, Elop, Sinofsky, Muglia, Gundotra, Maritz. I have a tough time imagining any of them as the next CEO of Microsoft except for Paul. The question is what would it take to get him to do it. And Bill definitely isn’t coming back. It is hard to think of a founder of his stature who has done as good a job of extricating himself from his company as he has.

A few other other thoughts:

  • The most interesting question to me is whether this decision happened over months or weeks. You can infer very different catalysts depending on the timeframe.
  • It is now basically acknowledged there has been no succession plan.
  • The recent reorg, which is batshit crazy, looks even more crazy with Steve out of the picture. Still waiting for someone inside the company to sell, defend or rationalize this move to me.
  • I am still a staunch believer that the best option for the company is to break itself up. With expectations set on a single successor and a year to find that successor, this doesn’t bode well for a breakup. The board in theory could come back with this conclusion before Steve departs after a few disappointing interviews/rejections. But Steve clearly is not an advocate of this approach.
  • With Steve’s fate settled, I expect more eyes turn to John Chambers. Steve became CEO at the top of the dot com market peak in 2000 and subsequently was at the helm as the company lost hundreds of billions in market cap. At the time, he’d lost more market cap than any CEO in history, which was definitely not a badge he wore with pride. After Cisco went on to lose even more market cap, Steve was known to bellow “Thank god for John Chambers”.